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Abstract 
This article is about contested norms in inter-national encounters in global fisheries governance. It illustrates how 
norms work by reconstructing the trajectory of the 1995 ‘Turbot War’ as a series of inter-national encounters among 
diverse sets of Canadian and European stakeholders. By unpacking the contestations and identifying the norms at 
stake, it is suggested that what began as action at cross-purposes (i.e. each party referring to a different fundamental 
norm), ultimately holds the potential for fairer fisheries governance. This finding is shown by linking source and settle-
ment of the dispute and identifying the shared concern for the balance between the right to fish and the responsibility 
for sustainable fisheries. The article develops a framework to elaborate on procedural details including especially the 
right for stakeholder access to regular contestation. It is organised in four sections: section 1 summarises the argument, 
section 2 presents the framework of critical norms research, section 3 reconstructs contestations of fisheries norms 
over the duration of the dispute, and section 4 elaborates on the dispute as a prelude to fairer fisheries governance. 
The latter is based on a novel conceptual focus on stakeholder access to contestation at the meso-layer of fisheries 
governance where organising principles are negotiated close to policy and political processes, respectively. The conclu-
sion suggests for future research to pay more attention to the link between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ of norms in critical 
norms research in International Relations theories (IR). 
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1. Introduction 
This article is about norms in international relations. It 
understands ‘inter-national relations’ as the interac-
tions between agents of distinct ‘national’ root context 
(as opposed to transnational relations where that dis-
tinction is blurred). As both socially constructed and 
structuring elements that are intrinsically interrelated 
with these agents, norms entail a dual quality. As part 
of the layered normative structure of meaning-in-use 
norms are re-/enacted through social interaction. As 
such they form the key link between agent and struc-
ture in any society. The following discusses the 1995 
‘Turbot War’1 as a series of inter-national encounters 
among stakeholders in global fisheries governance. By 
unpacking the contestations and identifying the norms 
                                                          
1 Publications on the ‘Turbot War’ abound, many of them 
reflecting emotional concerns of the authors, or a summary of 
these, as reflected among others by the Wikipedia entry (see: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turbot_War). A most notable 
academic account of the conflict has been presented by Allen 
L. Springer (1997). Section 3 of this article presents more 
detailed information of the event.  
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that were at stake, the article suggests that what began 
as action at cross-purposes, holds the potential for 
fairer fisheries governance based on the ultimately 
shared concern for the balance between the right to 
fish (UNCLOS Art. 116)2 and sustainable fisheries. The 
path to get there involves careful reconstruction of the 
contestatory practices displayed by all involved parties. 
The article presents a framework that allows research-
ers to elaborate on procedural details (i.e. contested 
norms in inter-national encounters) and normative is-
sues (i.e. the right for stakeholder access to regular 
contestation). To that end the contestations of three 
types of norms in the sector of fisheries governance 
are addressed by agents including two sets of state-
plus stakeholders in Canada and in Europe. As will be 
further detailed with reference to the research frame-
work and the case study respectively, the contested 
norms include sustainability, responsibility to protect 
fish-stock from extinction as well as the rule of law, as 
norms that are categorised as type 1; and the 200NM 
limit of the Exclusive Economic Zone (hereafter: EEZ), 
mesh-size and total allowable catch (hereafter: TAC) as 
type 3. Notably, however, the negotiation of the specif-
ic weighing and reasoning for the details of TAC in-
cludes agreement on individual quotas, percentages 
and regulatory measures, and therefore requires regu-
lar contestation in various discursive spaces at the me-
so-layer. This qualification as interactive and procedur-
al suggests moving the TAC into the category of type 2 
norms. The case evaluation will return to this im-
portant point in due course. Other type 2 norms that 
would facilitate a via media such as the precautionary 
approach3 or regular access to contestation were less 
vital to the dispute itself, however they acquired a 
central role in the settlement (compare Tables 1 and 
2 below). 
The article applies the ideal typical distinction of 
norms types according to their degree of specification, 
generalisation and moral reach. It suggests that better 
understandings of the work of type 2 norms pave the 
way towards replacing cross-purpose contestations at 
the micro- and macro-layers of global governance by 
common purpose interaction at the meso-layer.4 To 
                                                          
2 United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea (hereafter: 
UNCLOS), Article 116 on the “Right to fish on the high seas 
stipulates: All States have the right for their nationals to 
engage in fishing on the high seas subject to: (a) their treaty 
obligations; (b) the rights and duties as well as the interests of 
coastal States provided for, inter alia, in article 63, paragraph 2, 
and articles 64 to 67; and (c) the provisions of this section.” 
3 Notably and importantly the “precautionary approach” was 
introduced at the UN conference on straddling stocks following 
the dispute in 1995. For details, see Northwest Atlantic Fishery 
Organization (2016b). 
4 For details of this novel research focus on the meso-layer in 
global governance in distinct sectors including security, climate 
and fishery see Wiener (2014, p. 76). 
that end the article undertakes two steps: first it pre-
sents the key elements of critical norms research which 
are illustrated by the case of the 1995 ‘Turbot War’, 
and second it evaluates the case study with regard to 
the normative goal of filling the legitimacy gap of fish-
eries governance by enhancing conditions for stake-
holder access to contestation. Three distinct scenarios 
are at play: the domestic Canadian scenario, the re-
gional European scenario and the inter-national scenar-
io. The scenarios are linked by the common reference 
to the general narrative of the ‘Turbot War’. The dis-
pute is presented through the reconstruction of—
mostly—inter-national encounters norms of fisheries 
governance are contested. By distinguishing three sce-
narios of contestation, which are interrelated through 
moments of interaction in the dispute, the article puts 
an emphasis on the socio-cultural contingency of dis-
tinct perspectives.  
Each perspective informs distinct contestatory 
practices, as it draws on and contributes to the social 
construction of the narrative, and each is constitutive 
for the normativity that ultimately enhances or reduces 
the legitimacy of the norms of fisheries governance. By 
disaggregating these contributions it becomes possible 
to account for diverse background experiences. As po-
tential sources of conflict these have also been re-
ferred to as ‘latent’ contestation.5 Subsequently, the 
respective storytellers’ narratives about wars differ: 
notably, the endpoint is often less disputed than the 
source of conflict. The ‘Turbot War’ was no exception 
from this pattern. Like all narratives it had a beginning, 
a high point and an end.6 With regard to the time-
frame, it is notable, however, that while the dispute 
reached its high point and settlement in 1995, a legal 
case brought before the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) on behalf of one conflicting party, only came to an 
end in 1998 with the ICJ declaring that it had “no juris-
diction to adjudicate upon in the dispute”.7 The source 
of the dispute was not straightforward. For example, 
according to the Canadian narrative the source of the 
conflict was situated much further back in the past 
than by the Europeans’ account8. And as far as the le-
gitimating reference for the war-like activities was con-
cerned, notably, the Canadian narrative centred on the 
more vaguely defined sustainability norm (type 1), 
whereas the European narrative centred on the set of 
                                                          
5 I am grateful to Peter Niesen for suggesting this term. 
6 On the concept of narratives compare generally Della Sala 
(2015), and especially with regard to the concept in 
international relations Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle 
(2014). 
7 See International Court of Justice (1998); see also: “Judgment 
of 4 December 1998” in United Nations (UN, 2003). 
8 The following sections elaborate in more detail about the 
term ‘European’ which especially in media was often used in 
multiple ways, thereby blurring knowledge about the actually 
involved agents. 
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clearly defined type 3 norms at first, and was pitched 
by reference to the rule of law (type 1) at the high 
point of the political dispute. The interplay of the dis-
tinct perceptions of background, substance and timing 
of the conflict is captured by a ‘cycle of contestation’ 
all involved stakeholders were situated throughout 
(see Figure 1). The effect of this interplay is then pro-
jected onto the issue of normative ownership. The 
former displays the conceptual framework for the ‘is’, 
the latter the framework for the ‘ought’ (compare sec-
tions 3 and 4 for the case study and the evaluation, re-
spectively).  
As an illustrative case, the unpacking of the ‘Turbot 
War’ narrative suggests that the reconstruction of dis-
tinct norm contestations and their critical evaluation 
advance insights about the interplay between formal 
validity and perceived validity of norms, and how this 
relation affects stakeholder behaviour. By reconstruct-
ing norm contestations in context and taking into ac-
count the link between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’, the ar-
gument suggests moving beyond the task of accounting 
for normative meanings (i.e. what is) and adding the 
normative question of how to enhance stakeholder 
participation. The remainder of the article summarises 
the core elements of the conceptual framework in sec-
tion 2. It then summarises the events of the ‘Turbot 
War’ with a special focus on inter-national encounters 
and contested norms of fisheries governance in section 
3. The concluding section 4 turns to the normative re-
flection of the link between the ‘is’ and ‘ought’ of 
norms with a view towards further research on norms 
in global governance. 
2. Conceptual Framework: Critical Norms Research 
This article’s normative proposition to reconstruct dis-
putes in global governance as a prelude for fairer gov-
ernance builds on the three seminal conceptual contri-
butions of IR constructivism: first, the impact of the 
socio-cultural environment on state behaviour;9 sec-
ond, the role of interactive practices of arguing and in-
ternalisation with regard to agents’ norm implementa-
tion and entrepreneurship;10 and third, the advanced 
methodology to account for practices and meaning.11 
While not always in agreement these three major con-
tributions enabled norms researchers to work with a 
set of concepts and methods to grasp the interplay be-
tween material and social facts (Ruggie, 1998), and 
                                                          
9 Compare Checkel (1998); Katzenstein (1996); Koh (1997); 
Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986). 
10 Compare Liese (2009); Müller (2004); Risse (2000). 
11 Compare Engelkamp, Glaab and Renner (2013); Hofius 
(2015); Hofius, Wilkens, Hansen-Magnusson and Gholiagha 
(2014); Hofmann (2015); Holzscheiter (2013); Müller and 
Wunderlich (2013); Wolff and Zimmermann (2015); Zimmer-
mann and Deitelhoff (2015). 
therefore to better account for the conditions of inter-
national interaction as socially constructed. This rich 
empirical background has led some researchers to en-
gage in the utilitarian study of “norm robustness” de-
spite contestation12. By contrast, this article is less in-
terested in the perseverance of a norm than in the 
effect of normative contingence.13 The former would 
pre-empt the assumption about whether a norm is a 
‘good’ or a ‘bad’ norm, while the latter works with the 
assumption that norm-ownership enhances normative 
legitimacy.14 While the universality vs. particularity ar-
gument has been discussed widely for example in the 
field of citizenship studies,15 the interplay between 
both has yet to become an issue of central interest in 
the field of norms research.  
Notably and despite a wealth of methodologically 
sound research about cultural meaning constructions 
critical norms researchers16 still tend to leave address-
ing the general normative issues of their findings to po-
litical theorists.17 To counter that trend and further de-
velop the innovative potential of critical norms 
research this article suggests linking normative quality 
with normative purpose of norms. To that end it cen-
tres on the questions why a norm should be followed 
and, whose norms should count. Taking into account 
the well-documented knowledge about cultural diversi-
ty and normative meanings that in different cultural 
contexts, the present article sheds light on the norma-
tive follow-up. It suggests linking knowledge about the 
constitution of norms (what is visible) with the norma-
tive question of how to enhance legitimacy in global 
governance (what is possible). The following summa-
rises the key conceptual elements of critical norms re-
search to that end. They include first the major typo-
logical distinctions about the typology of norms for 
interdisciplinary research on international relations, 
three distinct dimensions along which norms are prac-
ticed such as legal validity, social recognition and cul-
tural validation, as well as their interrelation based on 
allocation on the cycle of contestation. Second, they 
                                                          
12 See Zimmermann and Deitelhoff (2015). 
13 See especially Bjola and Kornprobst (2010); Kornprobst 
(2012), as well as Hofmann and Wisotzki (2014, p. 3). 
14 See generally for a critical approach that seeks to enhance 
the empowerment of ‘citizens’ in ‘struggle’ Tully (2002) and 
Tully (2008, p. 5); and especially for the concept of norm-
ownership in global governance the work of Park and 
Vetterlein (2010). 
15 See for example Soysal (1994); Somers (1995); Hanagan and 
Tilly (1999). 
16 Compare especially the current ‘ZIB Debate’ in the German 
IR journal Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen in 2013–
2015. 
17 Notwithstanding pro-active engagement with political theory 
that is well reflected by the growing field of International 
Political Theorists, norms research in particular has yet to pick 
up on this research.  
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involve the concept of background experience that al-
lows zooming in on the reconstruction of constitutive 
cultural practices for latent and open contestations of 
norms. The following details these elements in their 
turn. 
2.1. Typological Distinctions 
The typology of norms distinguishes three types of 
norms: fundamental norms, organising principles, and 
standards/regulations. Like all ideal types, these norm 
types have been derived inductively with regard to two 
questions18: first, what is the moral reach of the norm 
(high—medium—low), and second, what is the ex-
pected degree of contestation of a norm (high—
medium—low)? Answering the first question quickly 
finds human rights, the rule of law, democracy, sover-
eignty and other leading principles falling into the type 
1 group of norms which have been identified as “fun-
damental norms” (Wiener, 2008, p. 66). All share a high 
degree of moral substance with wider implications for 
theory and practice, and they also share a significant 
lack of specification. The latter implies that their validi-
ty remains to be specified by adjacent norms and spe-
cific procedures which stand to be implemented by ad-
ditional flanking action. By contrast norms with low 
moral implications are those that are most clearly de-
fined such as, for example, emission standards entail-
ing specific percentages, fishing quotas, or electoral de-
tails. All these fall into the group of type 3 norms of 
standards/regulations. In comparison, type 3 norms are 
more encompassing than type 1 norms with regard to 
their respective ‘validity’ detail. While knowledge of 
fishing quota or mesh-size regulations entails all the in-
formation required by the designated norm-follower in 
order to implement the norm, the knowledge about 
sustainable fisheries does not. That is, while the fun-
damental norm of sustainability may be adhered to as 
a taken-for-granted norm that enjoys wide social 
recognition, its implementation requires a variety of 
flanking actions. These flanking measures’ success de-
                                                          
18 Compare Goodin and Tilly (2006); Tilly (2006). 
pends on the socio-cultural contexts in which they are 
implemented. They add contingency to the way fun-
damental norms work in inter-national relations (com-
pare Table 1). 
This leads to answering the second question about 
the degree of contestation expected with regard of the 
distinct groups of norms. It is related to the answer to 
the first question insofar as the lower the degree of va-
lidity detail, the higher the required flanking measures 
in order to achieve implementation, and, accordingly, 
the higher the chance of contestation with regard to 
each of these measures. That is, contestation is higher 
with regard to fundamental norms than with regard to 
standards or regulations. While the latter may be more 
easily rejected, i.e. by jaywalking, over-fishing or skip-
ping a ballot, objection to fundamental norms usually 
involves a chain of contestatory practices that refer to 
distinct flanking measures including organising princi-
ples (type 2 norms) and standards/regulations (type 3 
norms). All can be brought to the fore by distinguishing 
normative dimensions and practices of norm validation 
that are attached to them. According to the typology, 
organising principles (type 2 norms) such as for exam-
ple common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) in 
climate governance19 evolve through policy or political 
practices. They are placed on the meso-layer of global 
governance where they fill the space that links the uni-
versal quality of fundamental norms, on the one hand, 
with the particular quality of standards and regula-
tions, on the other. In this linking role, they are most 
important for filling the legitimacy gap. 
2.2. Practice Dimensions of Norms and The Cycle of 
Contestation 
The concept of ‘validating dimensions of norms’ reflects 
the interactive quality that is bound by the (re-) 
enacted “normative structure of meaning-in-use”.20
                                                          
19 See especially the account offered by Brunnée and Toope 
(2010, p. 130ff). 
20 See Jennifer Milliken’s seminal article on discourse analysis 
in IR (Milliken, 1999); compare also Weldes and Saco (1996). 
Table 1. Norm-types in global fisheries governance. 
Norm Type / Layer Fisheries Moral Reach Contestation 
Fundamental Type 1 / Macro Sustainable Fisheries 
Right to Fish (UNCLOS Art. 
116) 
Wide High 
Organising Principle Type 2 / Meso Precautionary principle* 





Type 3 / Micro TAC, EEZ, Quotas 
Mesh-size 
Narrow Low 
Notes: *Established by NAFO in 1995 following the Turbot War; **Proposed organising principle (see e.g. Wiener, 2014, 
pp. 58-62). Source: Wiener (2008, 2014). 
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It is of key importance for the separate reconstruction 
of distinctive social practices vis-à-vis norms. Three 
such practices have been identified by norms research 
in the social sciences: formal validation, social recogni-
tion and cultural validation. Formal validation entails 
validity claims with regard to formal documents, trea-
ties, conventions or agreements. In the context of in-
ternational relations, formal validation is expected in 
negotiations involving committee members of interna-
tional organisations, negotiating groups, ad-hoc com-
mittees or similar bodies involving high-level repre-
sentatives of states and/or governments. Social 
recognition entails validity claims that are constituted 
through interaction within a social environment. The 
higher the level of integration among the group, the 
more likely becomes uncontested social recognition of 
norms. Different from formal validation where validity 
claims are explicitly negotiated, social recognition re-
flects mediated access to validity claims qua prior so-
cial interaction within a group. Cultural validation is an 
expression of individual expectation that is informed by 
individually held background experience. Given the di-
versity of individual expectations in inter-national rela-
tions, this dimension is an important indicator for norm 
conflict. Yet, it remains largely overlooked by current 
norms research. Each dimension has evaluative poten-
tial with regard to each of the three norm types. Nota-
bly—and this is the central emphasis of the critical ap-
proach to norms research that is derived from James 
Tully’s public philosophy21—access to these three di-
mensions is not equally shared among all stakeholders. 
This point is elaborated with reference to the figure of 
the ‘cycle of contestation’ (see Figure 1). 
As the cycle demonstrates, the position of the 
claims-maker vis-à-vis the norm decides about stake-
                                                          
21 See Tully (2002) and for the project of adopting Tully’s Public 
Philosophy in a New Key to IR see especially the work of 
Havercroft (2012) and Wiener (2008, 2014, 2016a). 
holder access. This position is distinguished with refer-
ence to the stage of norm implementation (i.e. consti-
tuting, referring and implementing) and the situation 
within a given social order (i.e. government representa-
tives, social group, individual). For example, at the 
treaty making stage where government representa-
tives of different national provenience come together, 
an individual will be able to evoke negotiating power 
her access to formal validation and cultural validation 
of sustainable fisheries, and pending on the negotiating 
group’s frequency of gatherings, relate to and shape 
social recognition as well. By contrast, at the imple-
menting stage at the micro-layer of global governance, 
individual fishing folk will be able to accept or oppose 
sustainable fisheries based on social recognition and 
follow or oppose the fishing quota. There is no room 
left for evoking powers of negotiating. The cycle of 
contestation demonstrates the potential positions in 
fields of global governance. By shedding light on the 
position of stakeholders, critical norms research moves 
on from questions about motivation (question: why 
comply with norms?) to a perspective on stakeholders 
(question: who has access to negotiation?). Braising a 
question about access it becomes possible to reach be-
yond “competent practices” to engage with the “prin-
ciple of contestedness”.22 It implies broadening the 
perspective to include a focus on the empowerment of 
stakeholders to actually partake validation.  
2.3. Background Experience 
As the cycle of contestation demonstrates, access to 
contestation is differentiated by contingency. The 
broader access to the three validating dimensions of a 
                                                          
22 For this sociological concept see Sending and Neumann 
(2011) as well as Adler and Pouliot (2011); for the latter 
principles of contestedness see Wiener (2014, pp. 58, 79ff). 
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norm become for stakeholders, the higher the poten-
tial for norm-ownership. In this scenario “background 
experience” (Wenger, 1998) plays an important role. It 
is constructed over time and, notably, it is carried indi-
vidually. Taking account of individually held back-
ground experience by studying “cultural practice” and 
then relaying it back to the ‘regulatory practice’ of the 
law (Tully, 1995) reveals the diversity of perceptions 
and makes them empirically accessible. The following 
elaborates this claim based on the distinction between 
two sources of appropriateness and their respective 
‘storage’ in the social environment. One source is con-
stituted by the practice of social recognition. It is locat-
ed outside the “individual human being” in interna-
tional relations (Gholiagha, 2016) in the context of 
social groups or communities. In turn, the other source 
is constituted through cultural validation and therefore 
carried by the individual human being. 
To make cultural validation visible it is necessary to 
engage in conversations with others. These conversa-
tions may emerge as spontaneous objections to norms. 
Alternatively they may be orchestrated. The more 
regular access to contestation becomes, the higher the 
chances of obtaining a sense of appropriateness among 
involved stakeholders. It follows that while social 
recognition works through the habitually enacted per-
ception of appropriateness, cultural validation requires 
the active cognitive engagement with diversity. That is, 
while norms do travel along with human beings once 
borders are crossed, normative baggage cannot be ex-
pected to match. Taking the change that occurs by 
moving community boundaries into account is of pre-
dominant importance for studies on global governance, 
especially, in research that touches on the global 
commons (Ostrom, 1990). It matters in particular for 
cases where inter-national relations are involved be-
cause these always involve the crossing of cultural 
boundaries. Here it is important to note that the con-
cept of ‘boundaries’ includes not only the literal step 
over the border of sovereign political entities, but also 
the crossing of invisible cultural boundaries when en-
gaging with others without sharing their cultural 
roots.23 That is, social recognition emerges through it-
erated group interaction within a social group or com-
munity—i.e. Katzenstein’s reference to a “community 
with a given identity” (Katzenstein, 1996, p. 5). 
In this social environment perceptions of appropri-
ateness abound, therefore sustaining the implementa-
tion of a legally validated norm based on the socially 
embedded perception of appropriateness. The litera-
                                                          
23 There is much more to be said on the issue of ‘cultural 
diversity’ here (compare McIlwain, 1947; Tully, 1995). Detailing 
this literature would however lead beyond the limits of this 
article (for more details on the ‘thin’ approach to ‘culture’ that 
underlies the concept of cultural validation, compare Wiener, 
2014, p. 47ff). 
ture refers to this interplay between legal and social 
dimensions of norm implementation as the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ (see Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; 
March & Olsen, 1989, 1998; Risse, 2000). The more ap-
propriate a legal norm in the eye of the beholder, the 
higher the likelihood for its uncontested implementa-
tion. This would account for the norms of sustainability 
and sovereignty which are both categorised as type 1 
norms (Wiener, 2008, p. 64). Notably, however, the 
shared perception of a norms appropriateness—i.e. a 
norm’s taken-for-grantedness—of these vaguely de-
fined type 1 norms decreases when zooming in from 
the macro-structures of order towards the social prac-
tices at the micro-layer (Hofius, 2015). In situations 
where the perception of appropriateness does not 
overlap among the involved stakeholders, social recog-
nition is not an available resource. While it may be 
generated through iterated interaction of stakeholders, 
for example, through regular benevolent encounters, it 
is important to realise for any research on norms that 
in the absence of social recognition, opposed interests 
will be enhanced rather than smoothened by distinct 
background experiences. As cultural validation kicks in, 
clashes or norms and cross-purpose talk is expected. 
This is the likely scenario in most international negotia-
tions. Accordingly, perceptions of norms are more like-
ly to clash than to overlap once borders are crossed. 
This poses the logical follow-up question of what needs 
to be accomplished in order to generate shared ac-
ceptance of norms?  
Rather than reducing conflict about the norms of 
fisheries governance to the legal arena of courts and 
the practice of arbitrations, the following sheds light on 
heretofore un-explored links between the legal core of 
fisheries regulations and the socio-cultural environ-
ment of their implementation. It is held that this 
change of focus allows for a shift from norm-setting 
agency at the constituting stage towards the involved 
stakeholders at the implementing stage. Given the di-
verse state-plus actorship involved in the contestation 
including the events that had been constitutive for the 
larger context of crisis that set the frame for this con-
flict, it is suggested to reconstruct the normative mean-
ings-in-use that were—if largely implicitly—held by the 
involved agents. If this argument holds true, then fur-
ther policy steps identifying measures to sustain the 
norm of sustainable fisheries, may not have to neces-
sarily include more and better legal measures, but may 
centre around enhanced stakeholder participation at 
the referring stage instead (compare Figure 1). The fol-
lowing section 3 applies the conceptual framework to 
make visible cultural validation in the ‘Turbot War’ and 
the process leading up to it (the ‘is’), on the one hand, 
and to make possible stakeholder access to contesta-
tion (the ‘ought’) of norm practice, i.e. the discussions 
of the normative consequences of the event.  
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3. Case Study 
3.1. The Dispute in Context 
The ‘Turbot War’ took place off the Canadian North At-
lantic coast from 9 March to 16 April 1995, involving as 
main contestants Canada and Spain (Galicia). In addi-
tion, Portugal, the UK, Ireland, Iceland and the EU have 
been party to the dispute at various stages. The recon-
struction of the dispute’s narrative includes incidents 
leading up to the dispute, incidents at the height and 
the end of the dispute. Events leading up to the ‘Turbot 
War’ involved, in the 1990s, “the collapse of the Grand 
Bank cod fisheries”, which brought a serious reduction 
of Greenland Halibut stock, which is also called Green-
land turbot.24 To counter the imminent fish-stock ex-
tinction the Canadian Government decided to imple-
ment a zero quota for Atlantic cod fisheries of Nova 
Scotia. Accordingly, it was prohibited to fish for cod25 
within the 200 NM EEZ26 off the Canadian Atlantic 
coast. This resulted in significant job losses in the Ca-
nadian Atlantic fisheries, leaving 40,000 unemployed 
(Springer, 1997, p. 48). The decision caused wide pro-
tests by Canadians. First, societal protest revealed the 
contention of the quota as a threat to the livelihood of 
the Canadian fishing. Second, high-level political pro-
test against the fishing the grounds right beyond the 
EEZ where the fish was breeding involved contestations 
on behalf of the Ministry of Fishery and Oceans within 
the context of international organisations.27 Effectively, 
these contestations erupted into a full-blown conflict 
including the use of guns vis-à-vis the Spaniards.  
The incident that ultimately triggered what was lat-
er dubbed the ‘Turbot War’ was the moment when 
“Canadian authorities boarded and seized the Spanish 
trawler Estai about 220 miles [sic] east of Newfound-
land for violating Canadian fisheries regulations.” As 
observers noted, “[i]n an unprecedented show of 
force, Canadian ships fired across her bow, before 
boarding and towing the trawler to Newfoundland” 
(Bigney & Wilner, 2008, p. 6). That is, the involved Ca-
nadians made use of machine guns and water cannons 
(see Schäfer, 1995, p. 437). The Estai was then seized, 
their fishing gear was cut off and the vessel was then 
                                                          
24 For details, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenland_ 
halibut 
25 “By the 1990s, the Newfoundland cod fishery had collapsed, 
forcing the government to declare a moratorium on all fishing.” 
(Vogt, 2010). 
26 Compare United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Articles 
56-61, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements 
/texts/unclos/part5.htm  
27 Here, Canadian reports stress the importance of Canadian 
contributions to the UN Straddling Stocks Conference—
compare Springer’s detailed report of interventions in the early 
to mid-1990s (Springer, 1997, pp. 55ff). 
taken to the UN headquarters in New York. The inci-
dent was considered a “flagrant violation of the laws of 
the high seas” by the European Union (EU) considering 
the seizure of a ship flying the flag of an EU member 
state (Nickerson, 1995, p. 14, cited in Springer, 1997, p. 
26).28 “…and Spanish ships were soon dispatched to 
protect other Spanish fishermen [sic]” (Springer, 1997, 
p. 26). Given its location 20NM beyond the 200NM EEZ 
the Galician trawler was in international waters and 
hence formally not in breach with international law. 
Clearly defined regulatory norms (type 3) setting 
standards for fisheries governance were available 
based on common global and regional regulatory 
frameworks, most importantly the umbrella treaties of 
the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) which identifies the norms for fishing on the 
high seas as well as the activities of the various Region-
al Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMO) such as 
the North Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO).29 Ac-
cording to the purely legal perspective that involved 
reference to the formal validity of the rule of law (type 
1) as well as TAC and EEZ (type 3), the Canadian reac-
tion appears as a breach of international law. The 
question that was immediately raised, however, was 
whether it was also disproportional under the circum-
stances of the Canadian trajectory of taking acts with a 
view to responsible fish-stock preservation (type 1).  
The following recalls documented contestations of 
central fisheries norms that were at stake, and which 
were made by way of inter-national interventions. The 
reconstruction leads beyond the war narrative and 
demonstrates how the two conflicting parties began at 
cross-purposes with their inter-national encounters 
(compare Table 2). 
The Canadians emphasised the importance of pre-
venting fish-stock from extinction by making reference 
to the sustainability principle and the principle of a re-
sponsibility to protect fish-stock in the absence of ac-
tion by the global community in this regard. In their 
contestations Canadian stakeholders justified their ac-
tions with reference to “grave and imminent threat” 
and to “an essential interest” in fighting fish-stock ex-
tinction on behalf of the Canadians (Beesley & Rowe, 
1995, cited in Springer, 1997, p. 44). To them “the issue 
was conservation, not how the resources is divided” 
(Springer, 1997, p. 54). And as Brian Tobin Federal Min-
ister of Fishery and Oceans at the time detailed, “[O]ur 
objective was not to get a bigger slice of the pie. Our 
objective was to ensure that there would be pie, there 
would be [a] resource for the future” (Farnsworth, 
1995c, p. A2, cited in Springer, 1997, p. 54). The em-
phasis on the sustainability norm was even supported
                                                          
28 See Nickerson (1995). 
29 Compare, UNCLOS Art. 116; and for the interrelations among 
the regulatory bodies, see generally  
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (2015). 
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Table 2. Inter-national encounters at cross purposes? 
Norm Types Contested Norms Relevance Canada Relevance Europe 
Type 1 Sustainability 





 Rule of Law Low High 
Type 2 Precautionary Principle* Even Even 
 TAC** Even Even 






Notes: *Outcome of dispute settlement in 1995; **Readjusted by dispute settlement in 1995. Source: Author’s recon-
struction of case material as cited in text. 
with reference to the Canadian “responsibility of pro-
tecting these fish stocks for the rest of mankind”. 
While Canadians did not wish to claim this responsibil-
ity, they adhered to it nonetheless when Clyde Wells 
pointed out that “absent an effective international 
agency, Canada…has the responsibility…[to act] until 
such time as the international community is prepared 
to take responsibility” (MacNeil, 1995, cited in Spring-
er, 1997, p. 54, emphasis added by the author). In oth-
er words, as long as the global community’s regula-
tions were not fit to protect fish-stock from extinction, 
that obligation fell to the Canadians.30 As Tobin sum-
marized later, the point was to demonstrate “a first 
step in instilling in [Canadian] waters and around the 
world an effective enforcement regime.” (Kaye Fulton 
& Demont , 2003). 
By contrast the Europeans stressed the need to re-
establish security and in the words of European Union 
Fisheries Commissioner Emma Bonino “the rule of law 
on the high seas” (Springer, 1997, p. 39, emphasis add-
ed by the author).31 That is, European stakeholders 
stressed the formal validity of the law as specified by 
the type 3 norms, especially the EEZ limit as well as TAC 
(Springer, 1997, pp. 27, 39). Thereby justifying their ac-
tion with regard to international law, with Bonino 
pointing out that “European vessels, operating in full 
respect of International Law and NAFO regulations, 
may not be prevented from fishing” (Springer, 1997, p. 
39). In addition, Bonino accused the Canadians of “ille-
gal seizure” of the Estai (Bryden, 1995, cited in Spring-
er, 1997, p. 52). Importantly, the European discourse 
did not stress sustainability, but perseverance of the 
rule of law on the high seas. As Table 2 shows the inter-
                                                          
30 For similar rationales, compare the Maastricht judgement of 
the German Constitutional Court 1993 (BVerfGE 89, 155 of 12 
October 1993, Az: 2 BvR 2134, 2159/93); as well as the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) judgment in the Kadi case 2008 
(ECJ, Joined Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P, Yassin Abdullah 
Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the 
European Union and Commission of the European 
Communities [2008] ECR I-6351). 
31 Next to EU Fisheries Commissioner Bonino, the Spanish 
Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food Atienza was 
engaged in the European set of stakeholders (Springer, 1997, 
p. 51). 
national encounters revealed contestations at cross 
purposes in all but one respect: with regard to type 1 
norms, Canadians valued sustainability, whereas the 
Europeans stressed the rule of law, with regard to type 
3 norms, Canadians stressed the importance of mesh-
size more than the limits of the EEZ, whereas the Euro-
pean stakeholders’ contestations revealed reverse 
preferences. While the total TAC was highly contested 
especially given the complex trajectory of prior agree-
ments on both sides leading up to the percentage, both 
parties acknowledged its relevance. And, in the end, it 
was this norm that carried the weight of the settle-
ment of the conflict on 15 April 1995, where both par-
ties made compromises with regard to the TAC, and 
the role of NAFO as the regional regulatory body was 
endorsed.32 
3.2. What Happened Here?  
There have been numerous accounts of the dispute in-
cluding different descriptions of the involved parties, 
for example, the Estai has been interchangeably identi-
fied as Spanish, Galician, European and so on. Academ-
ic observers noted that, “[R]easons given for such an 
aggressive action were the past overfishing of turbot 
and other species by foreign countries, the illegal use 
of mesh-size of EU nets and the lack of overview of po-
licing overfishing” (Missios & Plourde, 1996, p. 145). 
Other researchers assigned the comparatively aggres-
sive Canadian behaviour the quality of a morally moti-
vated intervention on behalf of sustainable fisheries 
(Matthews, 1996). While much of the literature com-
menting on the dispute at the time discussed the ne-
cessity of “enforcement” and the issue of lacking 
measures under international law.33 As Springer’s ex-
cellent documentation and discussion of this debate 
                                                          
32 For the details see Springer (1997, pp. 36-37) citing Buerkle 
(1995) and Farnsworth (1995c, p. A2). 
33 Compare Allen L. Springer (1997) for an excellent overview 
of this literature. Notably, according to the Naval Service Act 
from 1919 when “most of Canada’s maritime activity was 
conducted by the Canadian Department of Marine and 
Fisheries, the fourth mandate of the Canadian Navy involves 
the protection of fisheries” (Bigney & Wilner, 2008, p. 3). 
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shows, that perspective emphasised legal enforcement 
procedures. And, for example, a utilitarian analysis of 
the dispute could argue that two interests stood op-
posed, concluding that the conflict was solved based on 
the amounts of money exchanged, and the trawler being 
returned and TAC quotas agreed for future fisheries. 
Given the ongoing interest in the dispute beyond its 
settlement based on material resources, this article 
acknowledges the diversity condition of inter-national 
encounters as an important source for latent contesta-
tion. To avoid similar disputes in the future and/or 
learn from the experience of this dispute, it is therefore 
worthwhile identifying the sources as places where 
background experiences are ‘stored’. It suggests that 
by elaborating on the link between the ‘is’ and ‘ought’ 
of normative practice, it is possible to peer beyond this 
material settlement. While not disputing the formal 
points raised by that literature, this article’s argument 
suggests that by reconstructing and comparing distinct 
discourses of norm contestation the dispute’s source 
and outcome may be considered with a different pur-
pose in mind, namely, what are the possibilities of 
stakeholdership claims with a view to future develop-
ments of fisheries governance. What, if both parties’ 
contestations were justified given their respective 
background experience? Does the dispute reveal ac-
cess points that allow for improving stakeholder access 
to contestation? This finding would facilitate a better 
grasp of the discursive space where organising princi-
ples negotiated and therefore contribute to a fairer or-
ganisation of global fisheries governance. 
The scenario of the dispute was perceived quite dif-
ferently from the respective Canadian and Spanish per-
spectives. The Canadians who sought to protect the 
fish-stock felt their attack of the Spanish trawler, while 
formally illegal (i.e. fundamental norm of sovereignty, 
principle of non-intervention), was legitimate both 
with regard to the sustainability principle (i.e. the fun-
damental norm of sustainable fisheries) in protection 
of the global commons, and with regard to their per-
ceived right to protect their livelihood. As a result, dis-
tinct background experience and expectations lead to a 
clash of norms.34 The situation demonstrates the po-
tential for cross-purposes of formal validation on the 
one hand, and cultural validation, on the other, quite 
well. The result consists in two perceptions of legiti-
mate behaviour based on distinct validity claims: while 
the Canadian moratorium intended to preserve one 
type of fish stock (cod), the fact that other fish (turbot), 
which was caught by using means that were in breach 
with their specific mesh-size regulations, demonstrates 
the at times significant contradiction between per-
ceived validity and perceived appropriateness differs 
                                                          
34 According to Matthews the Canadian action was justified 
with reference ‘‘to moral rather than legal terms’’ (Matthews, 
1996, p. 505). 
among stakeholders in inter-national encounters. This 
difference in perception matters because it informs the 
way the existing normative structure is re-enacted by 
the parties of the dispute. The at times quite contradic-
tory interpretation of that structure and the resulting 
deviation in compliance with norms is the likely cause 
for conflict in all situations that are not regulated by a 
single legal order, but by a range of overlapping legal 
regimes that work beyond the state and within distinct 
social environments at that. Given that this situation is 
the rule rather than the exception in global govern-
ance, it is important to understand how the diversity of 
experience and expectation of the involved stakehold-
ers plays out.  
The point here is to demonstrate how different 
segments in the cycle of contestation come into play. 
While the regulations set by the Canadian authorities 
were reasonable with reference to the fundamental 
norm (type 1 norm) of sustainable fisheries, aiming to 
sustain the recovery of fish-stock and thereby the live-
lihood of the fishing folks in the long run, the zero quo-
ta was a regulation (type 3 norm), which had a dra-
matic and immediate effect first of all on the 
Canadians. It was the Canadian efforts and subsequent 
grudge vis-à-vis the European stakeholders that en-
countered an enforcement problem. In turn, Galician’s 
considered their conduct with regard to the fishing of 
turbot as legal because their access to turbot was con-
sistent with international law and supported by EU pol-
icy. After all, they were fishing outside the EEZ and 
therefore in international waters where no legally en-
forceable mesh-size regulations for turbot were in 
place at the time (see MacDonald, 2002). In addition, 
Galicia’s position vis-à-vis the Spanish state has often 
been considered as special insofar the Galician com-
mitment to comply with agreements between Spain 
and the EU has traditionally been limited. Spain’s 
membership in NAFO only lasted three years from 
1983–86, when Spain “together with Portugal, acceded 
to the EEC in 1987 and ceased membership in NAFO 
(subsequently being represented by the EEC)”35. The 
objective of NAFO, as stated in the Convention36, is “to 
contribute through consultation and cooperation to 
the optimum utilization, rational management and 
conservation of the fishery resources of the Conven-
tion Area. The Convention applies to all fishery re-
sources in the Convention Area except salmon, tunas 
                                                          
35 See Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO, 2016a). 
36 The Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, signed on 24 October 1978 in 
Ottawa, came into force on 1 January 1979 following the 
deposit with the Government of Canada the instruments of 
ratification, acceptance and approval by seven signatories: 
Canada, Cuba, the European Economic Community (EEC), 
German Democratic Republic (GDR), Iceland, Norway, and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) (NAFO, 2016a). 
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and marlins, cetaceans managed by the International 
Whaling Commission, and sedentary species (e.g. shell-
fish).” (NAFO, 2016a). This was, however, contested by 
the Canadians who insisted on a stronger regulative 
power of NAFO regulations that established a larger 
mesh-size than the Estai used. As Tobin claimed in the 
Canadian House of Commons: “The net had a 115 mm 
mesh, which is smaller than the 130 mm required by 
NAFO. In addition, the net in question had an 80 mm 
liner in the net” (Commons Debates, 15 March 1995, p. 
10511, cited in Matthews, 1996, p. 514). According to 
Tobin’s view, the Estai’s fishing practice was in breach 
with the regulations set by NAFO. 
3.3. Formal vs. Perceived Validity 
The incident achieved significant public and media at-
tention due to the range of Canadian stakeholders par-
ticipating in the activities (i.e. including fishing folk, the 
navy, coastguards and government representatives at 
various layers of social order). All were claiming legiti-
mate stakeholdership in the narrative of the ‘Turbot 
War’. Given this background, the point of the quasi-
martial engagement was not a question of right or 
wrong that could be addressed with exclusive refer-
ence to the formal validity of a norm (i.e. the wording 
in the legal document). Instead, the conflict evolved 
around the perceived validity of a norm (i.e. the per-
ception of appropriateness). While the Canadians re-
ferred to the latter, the Europeans referred to the for-
mer (see Table 2). In addition, Canadian background 
experience entailed the stored experience with the 
drastic zero-quota decision regarding Canadian cod 
fisheries. Accordingly, a shared if invisible link between 
cod and turbot fisheries existed that was cast forward 
from the experience with Canadian fisheries policies in 
the 1990s (i.e. the zero quota policy on Atlantic cod 
fishing which left a large part of the Atlantic fisheries 
population out of work, and which triggered contesta-
tions about fisheries norms among domestic stake-
holders in Canada) towards the international conflict 
that triggered the 1995 Turbot War (i.e. the conflict 
about turbot over-fishing which created contestations 
among international stakeholders including Canadians 
and Europeans).  
The reconstruction of the dispute over what the Eu-
ropean stakeholders presented as straightforward legal 
situation according to international law, revealed that 
for Canadian stakeholders past experience with one 
type of fish and the threat of extinction (i.e. cod) had 
created an environment in which fisheries stakeholders 
felt that overfishing was not appropriate. According to 
this perceived threat, the action not only appeared 
just. It was also justified based on proportionality with 
reference to the fundamental responsibility to protect 
fish-stock from extinction.37 This meant endorsing the 
fundamental norm of sustainability at a high degree of 
appropriateness. That is, the diverse domestic range of 
Canadian stakeholders shared the social recognition 
that their values were betrayed by the legal contesta-
tions of the Europeans, notwithstanding that the latter 
were catching another type of fish at the time (i.e. tur-
bot), and that this activity was not in breach of the law. 
Approached from this long-term reconstructive per-
spective that connects events from the past with pre-
sent day contestations, the dispute was presented as 
triggered by a perceived breach on with the type 1 
norm of sustainability on behalf of the Europeans. To 
enforce the point, the Canadians made additional if 
highly contested reference to the European breach 
with the Canadian recommended mesh-size standard 
(type 3). The latter was widely publicised with the help 
of media effective advocacy.  
3.4. What Is There to Learn from This Incident? 
While the case of the various ‘wars’ in the sector of 
global fisheries governance may seem folkloric to non-
fishing folks, these encounters shed light on the inter-
play of different cultural roots of the validity claims 
that came to the fore by the contestations. In fact, dis-
tinct cultural experiences are likely to suggest a differ-
ent expectations and hence diverging interpretations 
of norms that are formally valid. As a site of inter-
national encounter the ‘Turbot War’ offers substantive 
insight into the way norms play out in global govern-
ance. It begins from the simple question: if you were to 
assume—for a moment—that you were aboard a fish-
ing vessel pursuing fish-stock on the high seas (i.e. un-
der the jurisdiction of international law) and noticed 
that another vessel was engaged an activity that you 
perceived as ‘not legitimate’ (i.e. unfair, inappropriate, 
or otherwise improper), what would your reaction be 
to settle the contested issue? Would you contact a 
third party such as for example the most trusting politi-
cal or legal representative in whichever country closest 
by VHF (Very High Frequency) or other means of com-
munication? Or would you, given the location of your 
vessel and the urgency of the situation, choose to en-
gage directly with the other vessel? The Canadians’ de-
cision resonates with a shift from contestation (i.e. ob-
jection to norms, and in this case, fisheries norms set 
on behalf of the Canadian state-plus fisheries stake-
holdership) to conflict (i.e. confronting the Spanish 
trawler with acts of violence that were in breach of the 
law). As this article’s main argument holds, such shifts 
from contestation to conflict may be prevented based 
on regular access to contestation for all involved 
stakeholders, while the narrative of the dispute has 
                                                          
37 Compare Beesley and Rove (1995, cited in Springer, 1997, p. 
49). 
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been ‘of war’, this article’s unpacking of the narrative 
into inter-national encounters suggests that the con-
cept of ‘dispute’ involving a series of contestations is 
more helpful. 
It is important to note that while the sector of fish-
eries governance forms part of UNCOLS and as the 
most advanced framework of international legal norms 
and as such reflects a high degree of formal validity, 
fisheries norms involve a high degree of latent contes-
tation. This is due to the dual dynamics of movement in 
the fisheries sector: on the one hand, fishing vessels 
regularly cross territorial boundaries, on the other 
hand and relatedly, many types of fish-stock naturally 
move beyond such formally defined limits. It results 
that “[D]espite the changes in ocean law made by the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
and the evolving customary state practice that under-
girds it, there remains substantial concern about the 
fate of fish stocks that straddle zones of national con-
trol or cross between national zones and the high seas” 
(Springer, 1997, p. 32). It follows that further agree-
ments about “measures for the conservation” of fish 
are required (see UNCLOS, 1982, 1283, cited in Spring-
er, 1997, p. 32). 
As a rule, “treaty language” is kept relatively vague 
in order for treaties, conventions, agreements and 
other formal documents to be signed.38 In turn, the 
rules and standardized procedures to implement trea-
ties are much more specific. Accordingly, type 1 norms 
are kept relatively vague in international agreements 
so that despite their formal validity they leave some 
margin to interpretation. This makes it possible for a 
diverse group of signatories to agree following a series 
of negotiations and consultations.39 The same accounts 
for Regional Fisheries Management Organisations that 
also remain “a matter of contention” (Springer, 1997, 
p. 38), therefore leaving margin for stakeholder en-
gagement with a view to specifying the norms they 
consider essential. As studies of global environmental 
governance have shown, these legalised procedures 
seldom offer sufficiently sound reference to convince 
all involved stakeholders. Especially, cases where the 
global commons are involved, such as in the sector of 
environmental, climate, oceans or fisheries govern-
ance, a gap between type 1 and type 3 norms, and 
which can be located at the meso-layer of social order 
in global governance, remains. Therefore, the meso-
layer delineates the space where discursive interaction 
among stakeholders is most likely to take place. It is 
                                                          
38 See the seminal article by the Chayeses for details (Chayes & 
Chayes, 1993). 
39 Compare, for example, the general agreement of 
international agreements such as the United Nations Fishstock 
Agreement (UNFSA) of 1995 which despite enjoying 
widespread “acceptance of UNFSK…is not universal” 
(Asmundsson, 2014, pp. 2-4). 
defined as the space for critical intervention in global 
governance, and stands to be carved out by exploring 
the ‘ought’ question of what is possible.40 As this arti-
cle’s reconstructive analysis of the ‘Turbot War’ re-
veals, this meso-layer facilitates the space where 
norms such as the precautionary principle or even nov-
el agreements about ways of distributing total allowa-
ble catch (TAC) emerge. These norms are defined as 
type 2 norms, which are generated through politics and 
policy-making, play an important role in the process of 
generating legitimacy. Following the disaggregation of 
the narrative and the reconstruction of the contingent 
contestations of the involved stakeholders the ‘war’ 
narrative is more fittingly replaced by a core contesta-
tion of fisheries governance. For similar contestations 
in other sectors consider, for example the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) in 
global climate governance.  
In practice, this definition of fundamental norms 
creates an onus for continuous interpretative assess-
ment on a case-by-case basis; and it is also a cause for 
many political contestations.41 In the process additional 
rules and regulations are developed. As standardised 
procedures these type 3 norms are much more specific 
and as a rule to not leave much margin for speculation, 
interpretation or contestation. The question is, who 
has the legitimate right to access in this process? As 
the following section argues, from a normative per-
spective that envisages the highest potential of legiti-
macy, norm ownership is key to this process. Following 
the reconstruction of the central contestatory practices 
and reference to norms on behalf of the involved 
stakeholders, the final evaluative section turns central 
attention to the second theoretical step, namely, es-
tablishing the theoretical link between the ‘is’ and the 
‘ought’ of global governance. To that end the question 
of how access to negotiating type 2 norms could help 
filling the legitimacy gap in global governance is ad-
dressed.  
4. Evaluation 
Taking into account the three distinct practices of nor-
mative evaluation two sources of the dispute’s escala-
tion matter in addition to formal validation. The first 
source is the social environment that matters for the 
implementation of a norm; the second source is the 
background experience of individual day-to-day prac-
tice. As noted above, while both are constituted 
through interaction in context, as compliance and re-
gime analyses have demonstrated in detail, conceptu-
                                                          
40 For more detailed elaboration of the concept of critical 
intervention with reference to the politics of recognition see 
Tully (2008, 2014). 
41 See Chayes and Chayes (1995), Koh (1997), as well as 
Asmundsson (2014, p. 2) 
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ally the space where they are stored differs: one is 
group based, the other individually carried. The distinct 
storage space matters especially when inter-national 
encounters are at stake.  
Following the reconstruction of contestations based 
on the arenas in which all involved stakeholders oper-
ated, the three dimensions of normative practice come 
to the fore, i.e. legal validity, social recognition and cul-
tural validation (compare Figure 1). First, domestic Ca-
nadian stakeholders (including fishing folk, ministry, 
press, lawyers, politicians, navy, coastguard and so on) 
engaged in contestation of the 0% quota for cod (in the 
early 1990s), and generally, the Grand Bank fisheries 
problems, e.g. the tail-and-nose issue, and the role of 
regional organisations and international law. They 
demonstrate an emphasis on the perceived validity of 
fisheries norms. Second, regional European stakehold-
ers have focused on the regulatory norms of EEZ limita-
tion, TAC, and quotas. Their reference to the formal va-
lidity of these type 3 norms clashed with the Canadian 
emphasis on the perceived validity of the sustainability 
norm. It follows that European justifications were based 
on formal validity, prioritizing the language set within 
signed agreements under international law. At the same 
time, however, this justification was informed by the in-
dividual background experience of the Galician fishing 
folk losing out on European quotas as a result of Spanish 
EU accession in 1986. The third contestation comprises 
inter-national encounters of stakeholders including 
stakeholders in the domestic Canadian context, and 
their interaction with the Galician fishing folks, the 
Spanish and EU representatives as well as other inter-
national stakeholders such as especially the British 
(who intervened in support of the Canadians) or the 
Portuguese who supported the Spanish. 
The conflict emerged from the contradicting rele-
vance that was attached to the respective contested 
norms in order to justify stakeholder behaviour. A 
structural norms analysis would hold that these justifi-
cations reflect a conversation at cross-purposes. The 
central norm guiding the behaviour of the Canadian set 
of stakeholders was the sustainability norm; in turn, 
the guiding norms for the European set of stakeholders 
(except the British) were the EEZ and the TAC. By con-
trast an inter-relational perspective on norms would 
expect contestation to harbour (re-)constitutive ef-
fects. That is, through the practice of norm contesta-
tion along the three dimensions of norms, the mean-
ings of norms change. This is key for the aim of filling 
the legitimacy gap at the meso-layer of global govern-
ance. And, as noticed with regard to the core contesta-
tions of the dispute, norms such as organising princi-
ples had no visible impact on triggering the dispute. 
They were, however, central to its settlement. The 
question that follows from the insights generated by 
the reconstruction of the contestations, is whether 
more regular encounters between involved stakehold-
ers could make a difference in future conflicts. The fol-
lowing elaborates on this question with a focus on the 
type 2 norm of access to contestation. 
4.1. Access to Contestation 
The success of enhancing stakeholder access to contes-
tation depends on whether and how access to regular 
contestation is established—in principle—for all stake-
holders. Does a right to access exist, and is it feasible? 
To probe this, contestation stands to be mapped as a 
social practice, and shaped as an activity that is—in 
principle—norm generative. The two-tiered research 
design that is typical and conditional for successful bi-
focal research operationalisation is spelled out by Fig-
ure 1, which represents the empirical dimension, and 
by Table 3, which represents the normative dimen-
sion.42 As the cycle of contestation indicates by the ar-
rows, contestation can be carried in different ways: as 
social practice, it is contingent. Its effect therefore de-
pends on who is involved and where contestation takes 
place. Any agent who is able to access and capable to 
mobilize all positions on the cycle has a comparative 
advantage to others who do not. The cycle allows for a 
number of evaluative steps in order to identify the ex-
pected degree of contestation. It enables researchers 
to understand and explain the contestatory behaviour 
with reference to normative indicators. Based on this 
evaluation it is possible to identify first, the involved 
agents and the stage of norm implementation they en-
counter themselves with regard to a specific given 
norm, and secondly, the likelihood of norm ac-
ceptance. Both allow for the third step of developing 
potential solutions in cases where contestatory prac-
tices are likely to spark considerable political conflict. 
The cyclical model presented by Figure 1 entails 
three ideal typical situations that indicate whether the 
potential for contestation is expected to be high or 
low. These situations include the formal validity, social 
recognition and cultural validation of a norm. The cycle 
of contestation assigns three distinct stages of norm 
implementation (such as constituting, referring and 
implementing) to three types of agents (such as mas-
ters, owners and users). The normative move builds on 
the second hypothesis, which reads as follows. The po-
sitions on the cycle are not fixed. The cycle metaphor 
allows for an imaginary ‘spinning the wheel’ to change 
the ‘sites’ where the normative structure of meaning-
in-use is (re-)enacted. By changing the site, the agency, 
it is possible to envisage changes with regard to the 
                                                          
42 Note that, while in current research that draws on these 
findings, the author addresses the overlay of both, the limited 
framework of this article do not allow further detailed 
elaborations of this normative document. Therefore, it should 
suffice to summarise the central points of this argument here 
instead (see: Wiener, 2016a, 2016b).  
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stage of norm implementation (x-axis), on the one 
hand, and the segment on the cycle of contestation (y-
axis), on the other. According to the (re-)enacting the 
normative structure of meaning-in-use through formal 
validation is most likely to take place within a context 
that is qualified by formal institutions such as, for ex-
ample, committees of international organisations, trea-
ty negotiations and so on that involve encounters be-
tween government representatives and/or diplomats. 
The result of formal validation is most likely to be a 
treaty or any type of formal agreement. At this stage, 
negotiations will most likely focus on fundamental 
norms including a relatively broad, albeit little speci-
fied, moral and ethical reach.  
By contrast, (re-)enacting through social recognition 
is expected to occur in the context of well-established 
social groups. In this context informal institutions such 
as habits and routinized practices qualify the interrela-
tion between individuals. These may include all sorts of 
entities that have been constituted as stable groups 
through social interaction. The result of social recogni-
tion is most likely to be expressed through habitual 
norm-following behaviour. The degree of contestation 
is low because group members have been socialised in-
to accepting the normalcy of the norm. Cultural valida-
tion, in turn, sheds light on (re-)enacting as an interac-
tion among individuals that are likely to encounter 
each other as strangers with different individual back-
ground experience. In inter-national relations—
understood as encounters among agents with distinct 
national roots—this distinct normative baggage is 
therefore brought to bear across political borders or 
socio-cultural boundaries. At this cycle position the in-
stitutional context is the most flexible among the three 
possible ideal types. Why and how does this matter 
with regard to the answering the research question 
with regard to the legitimating impact of contestation? 
4.2. Stakeholders Are No Normative ‘Dupes’ 
If norm implementation is understood as the interac-
tive process of (re-)enacting normative meaning in use, 
it follows that norm implementation is not carried out 
by normative “dupes”.43 Instead, it is activated by 
agency that is capable of norm generation through the 
respective practices employed at the three stages. The 
first type of involved actors in this process is defined as 
the masters: For the masters of a treaty demonstrate 
the legitimacy of the treaty’s content with their signa-
ture. The second type of actor is defined by the con-
cept of owners. They are the stakeholders who refer to 
mid-range organising principles in their day-to-day ne-
gotiation of the ground rules of specific norms relevant 
to a global governance sector. The third type consists 
of the norm users who are expected to implement the 
norm on the ground as the designated norm followers. 
The research question that follows is: under which 
conditions do the involved actors obtain agency that 
enables them to develop ownership? 
As Table 3 indicates, the potential for norm owner-
ship is highest at the meso-layer in Quadrant B. By 
turning to the information provided by the empirical 
research underlying Figure 1, it emerges that norm-
ownership at the meso-layer is unlikely to evolve with-
out specific strategic innovations such as enhancing 
conditions for access to contestation. Given these 
three ideal typical situations, it is obvious that an over-
lap of mastership, ownership and followership of a 
norm will generate the highest compliance rates. Yet, 
in global governance settings, the occurrence of such 
overlap cannot be taken as a given. As frequent de-
bates of and breach with the norms of international 
                                                          
43 Compare Michael Barnett’s reference to the absence of 
culture in international relations (Barnett, 1999). 
Table 3. The normative model. 
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Source: Adaptation from Wiener, Hansen-Magnusson and Vetterlein (2014). 
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law have demonstrated, contested compliance is more 
likely than the reverse situation. Analysts and policy 
makers therefore need to design models that facilitate 
the best possible overlap between experience and ex-
pectation regarding the normativity of a norm among 
the highest number of stakeholders in order to gener-
ate the best possible outcome. The metaphor of the 
cycle of contestation demonstrates the difficulty in ob-
taining an optimal match between the positions on the 
cycle of contestation and the location in the global 
governance setting that allows for the development of 
norm ownership, on the other. 
This is documented by the normative approach, 
which demonstrates that the optimal site for stake-
holders to negotiate normativity (i.e. the ground rules 
of sectoral governance) is located at the meso-layer of 
social order (Table 3). Notably, the metaphor of cyclical 
contestation indicates the agent’s placement on one of 
three stages of norm implementation (x-axis) on the 
one hand, and, as enabled or constrained by the con-
tingency of the cycle position, on the other. Both are 
socially constituted and reflected at three layers of so-
cial order. At each of these layers normativity different 
actors have access to contesting normativity (see y-
axis). The cyclical involvement in contestation works as 
an indicator of the legitimacy gap in global governance. 
By disaggregating the sources of stakeholder empow-
erment into three practices of norm evaluation, it be-
comes possible to identify whether one, two or all 
three dimensions of norm evaluation are accessible for 
stakeholders. Thus, it is both possible to name the 
normative deficit and to develop means to counter it. 
In this regard, access to stakeholder contestation plays 
a central role for further research on inter-national en-
counters and contested norms. 
5. Conclusion 
While the conflictive inter-national encounter between 
state-plus actors culminated in 1995, the reconstruc-
tion of the events includes the duration of the Canadi-
an Atlantic fisheries’ “crisis” which had been going on 
for more than half a decade prior to that.44 The article 
unpacked the narrative of ‘war’ and sought to demon-
strate how background experience of diverse sets of 
stakeholders from distinct root communities came into 
play with regard to the development of the dispute. To 
that end, it carried out a reconstruction of the dispute 
thereby offering a fresh perspective on the much-
discussed problem of the global commons as a space 
where diverse stakeholders use limited resources, and 
interests prevail. Given that this space is regulated and 
structured by a normative grid that undergirds all prac-
tices, it was argued that reconstructing the practices 
applied by the Canadian and the European stakehold-
                                                          
44 Compare e.g. Bigney and Wilner's article (2008). 
ers, would allow for novel insights about contested 
normative meanings (the ‘is’ dimension) and, following 
from that, suggestions for paths towards filling the le-
gitimacy gap (the ‘ought’ dimension). The article’s criti-
cal approach involved addressing the link between the 
‘is’ and the ‘ought’ of norms. This was done by address-
ing the two-fold challenge of making diverse meanings 
visible, and by thinking about how to make diverse 
stakeholder input possible.  
To that end, the article suggested linking the cycle 
of contestation as an explanatory model of contestato-
ry practices with the normative model of the legitimacy 
gap. It argued that new insights about conflict and le-
gitimacy stand to be gleaned from empirical recon-
structions of instances in which norms are contested 
within a specific sector of global governance such as for 
example fisheries governance. As a site of inter-
national encounter in fisheries governance the dispute 
allowed for an illustration of the link between the ‘is’ 
and ‘ought’ of norms research. The Spaniard’s legal yet, 
in the eyes of the Canadians illegitimate fishing prac-
tices of deep-sea fishing which—albeit not in breach 
with international law—stood in direct contrast with 
Canadian fishing practices. The Canadians claimed their 
contestation of the Spanish practice was legitimate 
both with reference to the fundamental norm of sus-
tainable fisheries (type 1) which they expected the 
Spaniards to follow, and with reference to their experi-
ence with the zero quota regulation (type 3) that 
threatened their livelihood and which was enhanced by 
the Spaniards’ fishing right beyond the EEZ. In this case 
a settlement at the meso-layer followed extensive con-
testations at various layers as noted in section 3. The 
distinct normative dimensions on the cycle of contesta-
tion shed light on the space at the meso-layer of social 
order where former cross-purpose action might, in the 
future, be channelled into common-purpose negotia-
tions. By respecting the right of access to contestation 
for involved stakeholders the complex process of TAC 
negotiations including state-plus agency guided by the 
precautionary principle could lead the way towards 
fairer fisheries governance.45 
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